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Abstract. The rapid development of network technologies entails an
increase in traffic volume and attack count. The associated increase in
computational complexity for methods of deep packet inspection has
driven the development of behavioral detection methods. These meth-
ods distinguish attackers from valid users by measuring how closely their
behavior resembles known anomalous behavior. In real-life deployment,
an attacker is flagged only on very close resemblance to avoid false pos-
itives. However, many attacks can then go undetected. We believe that
this problem can be solved by using more detection methods and then
correlating their results. These methods can be set to higher sensitivity,
and false positives are then reduced by accepting only attacks reported
from more sources. To this end we propose a novel sketch-based method
that can detect attackers using a correlation of particular anomaly detec-
tions. This is in contrast with the current use of sketch-based methods
that focuses on the detection of heavy hitters and heavy changes. We
illustrate the potential of our method by detecting attacks on RDP and
SSH authentication by correlating four methods detecting the following
anomalies: source network scan, destination network scan, abnormal con-
nection count, and low traffic variance. We evaluate our method in terms
of detection capabilities compared to other deployed detection methods,
hardware requirements, and the attacker’s ability to evade detection.
1 Introduction
With the dramatic development of network technology over last few years, the
number of Internet users and traffic volume has increased. Globally, the number
of Internet users is forecast to increase from 1.9 billion users in 2010 to 3 billion
in 2015. The amount of the traffic per average Internet user is estimated to grow
from 7.3 gigabytes per month to 61.8 gigabyte per month. Furthermore, global
consumer internet traffic is about to reach nearly 60 exabytes per month in two
years.[15] Along with the growth of the traffic volume, we monitor an increase
in the attack count. There was a 42 % increase in the targeted attacks in 2012
and more than 5 thousands of new vulnerabilities were discovered.[16]
Given the immense volume of traffic and arising computational complex-
ity, deep packet inspection becomes inefficient as a method for attack detection
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and prevention in large-scale networks. Therefore, behavioral detection methods
based on flow analysis have been deployed to detect attackers. Behavioral detec-
tion methods distinguish the attackers from valid users by comparing either how
their behavior resembles known anomalous behavior or how their behavior devi-
ates from valid behavior. Since there are many types of attacks, various methods
have been invented to detect them. Simple methods monitor basic network char-
acteristics and are based on na¨ıve thresholds, while more sophisticated methods
employ statistics or behavioral profiling based on more complex characteristics.
Real-life deployment of behavior detection methods has its problems, though.
Most methods described in current papers exhibit an excessive false positive ratio
and their deployment is subject to base-rate fallacy [1]. Because security admin-
istrators need to identify attackers with nearly absolute certainty, the parameters
of methods are set to minimize the false positive ratio. However, this minimiza-
tion results in higher false negative ratios and consequently higher number of
undetected attacks. There is also an issue with limited detection capabilities.
Currently available methods are usually able to detect a set of attacks that are
synergistic in their nature, e.g., port scanning and malware propagation. Meth-
ods that employ some form of event correlation to reduce false positives usually
focus on events with identical dimensions and are unable to take into account
the inherent uncertainty of some events.
Based on the previous discussion, we identify following research questions:
1. How can we correlate diverse anomaly reports from different sources with
different dimensions?
2. Can the correlation be done efficiently enough to permit deployment on high
speed networks?
3. What is the impact of correlation on the false positive and negative ratio?
To answer the stated questions we apply the following approach. First we
propose a correlation mechanism based on modularly hashed reversible sketches
and discuss its advantages and drawbacks. Then we use our preliminary imple-
mentation and deploy it in a network with more than 15.000 machines to assess
its efficiency by comparison with already deployed detection methods.
This paper is organized into five section. In Section 2 we give a brief back-
ground on base-rate fallacy, current state of statistic anomaly correlation, and
the concept of sketches. In Section 3 we explain in detail the concept of modular
key hashing scheme and our correlation method. In Section 4 we evaluate the
method both from theoretical standpoint and by experiments on a set of attacks.
In Section 5 we conclude our paper and present focus of our future research.
2 Background
In this section we present background for our work. First, we introduce a phe-
nomenon of base-rate fallacy of detection methods in real-life networks. Then we
briefly describe the approaches to lower false positives of detected events using
statistic correlation, and conclude with description of sketches.
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2.1 Base-rate fallacy
A base-rate fallacy is a phenomenon of Bayesian statistics. The base-rate fallacy
is committed when available statistical data are ignored in favor of specific data
to make a probability judgment. Base-rate fallacy in network intrusion detection
is well described by Axelsson [1]. Briefly, it states that false positive ratios (FP) in
units of percent are treated as a remarkable success in papers. However, in real-
life and large-scaled networks, due to the large amount of examined anomalies,
this FP ratio would result in an excessive number of false alarms.
A closer examination of various detection methods shows that even though
authors often claim very high detection efficiency, their results are still not suit-
able for deployment in real networks. For example, Casas et al. [2] in their clus-
tering method for detection of DoS attacks present a FP ratio 1-3.5 %. Francois
et al. [6] who detect bots using link analysis and clustering, give a FP ratio of
2 %. This is equivalent to several thousand false alarms in real-life deployment.
Even if they lowered the FP to 0,1 % by slightly reducing the true positive ratio,
it still represents several hundred FPs.
2.2 Statistic correlation of events with the same dimensions
Statistical correlation of events from more sources is a natural approach for
lowering false positives. This approach is typically used in networks where data
is gathered from multitude of sources, such as sensor networks. One approach
for correlating the results of methods used in sensor networks is proposed by
Ide´ et al. [9]. However, this approach requires homogeneity of gathered data
that typical networks cannot provide.
For IP networks, a number of approaches was suggested that correlate events
with the same dimensions to confirm an attack. They can process flows in sep-
arate time windows [6, 7], detect unexpected changes in time series [10, 21], or
measure co-occurrence of events of the same dimensions across multiple data
sources. [14]
There are, however, no correlation mechanisms that we know of that can
correlate temporally dependent events of different dimensions, e. g., a small in-
crease in the communication of multiple sources and a large increase in the
communication to one destination.
2.3 Sketches
Next approach to network management and anomaly detection are sketches. In
the area of anomaly detection, sketches are mostly used for detection of heavy
changes and heavy hitters, usually in the form of top percentile of traffic [3, 13,
22].
A sketch is a probabilistic data-stream aggregation technique that projects
a high dimensional network events into a smaller set of dimensions, by hashing
the event descriptors. In our case an event is a network flow and descriptors are
fields of a flow, e. g. source and destination addresses and ports. A sketch is then
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defined by one or more hash functions and a hash table with bucket count equal
to the output size of a hash function. Upon each new event a hashing function is
applied to event descriptors and the result is used as a key to identify a bucket
in the hash table that gets its value updated. Thus information about the entire
traffic can be stored in a limited and arbitrarily set space that is dictated by the
output size of a hashing function. This is an immense advantage for processing of
large data streams, because the hashing can be done very fast and the memory
footprint is constant, regardless of the traffic volume. Sketches also have linear
structure that enables easy arithmetic operations between different sketches.
Sketches have some disadvantages, though. Most notably collisions and neces-
sity to maintain a structure for sketch reversing due to irreversibility of hashes.
Collisions of hash functions could be solved using a k -ary sketch proposed by
Krishnamurthy et al. [11]. The k -ary sketch consists of H hash tables of size
K. Each incoming event is then hashed by H hashing functions into H tables.
This duplication enables to lower collisions to desired levels by modifying H
and K. An approach to hashing reversal is proposed by Schweller et al. [17, 18],
who achieved reasonable reversibility while keeping low memory footprint, high
throughput and detection accuracy.
Given their properties, sketches can be used beyond the detection of heavy
hitters and heavy changes. Thanks to their linearity, they can be also used for
correlation of anomalies and events with different dimensions.
3 Correlation of modularly hashed sketches
In the following section we will discuss the concept of modular hashing and
explain how it can be used for the correlation of detected anomalies.
3.1 Modular hashing
Generally, sketching algorithms work with k -universal hashing functions that
take the entire input and produce a sketch key in one step. This approach,
however, has two drawbacks. The first one is inherent to the nature of hashing
functions. Keys are not easily reversible to their original value and reconstructing
the original value in na¨ıve implementation may require checking all possible
inputs. The second is related to the essence of hashing functions that aim to
mangle as much bits of input as possible, thus destroying dependencies between
input descriptors. In case of multidimensional events with more descriptors (e.g.,
source and destination IP addresses, and source and destination ports, where
various anomalies can manifest), it is very problematic to reconstruct the nature
of an anomaly given only a key and a value.
The reversibility problem was already addressed using numerous approaches,
but we have chosen to adapt the method of modular hashing proposed by
Schweller et al. [18]. They have demonstrated that by relaxing requirements
on hash k -universality and then hashing input by separate parts (octets of IP
address in their case), it is possible to efficiently reverse keys of a sketch to their
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original value. We propose to extend this idea even further and hash each input
descriptor separately and then concatenating the result. In this paper we use
this notion of a key hashing an input event: K(I) = K(i1, . . . , in | i ∈ I) =
h(i1)|| . . . ||h(in). Input descriptors that are hashed to a key are referred to in
this paper as key parts.
Our proposed modular hashing scheme enables easy reversibility as well as
preserving dependencies between descriptors, which are two key properties for
our correlation method. These will be described next.
3.2 Correlation
Our proposed correlation method is built to work with the uncertainty that is
inherent in all anomaly detection methods. This uncertainty is usually dealt with
by setting high enough detection thresholds, but this entails the increase in false
negatives that we are trying to overcome. Instead of setting one threshold for
each detection method that is to be correlated, we are working with uncertainty
expressed as an anomaly score. This score represents the possibility that any
given network traffic is in fact an anomaly. To this end we operate with two
different types of sketches. The first one is the source sketch. This sketch accu-
mulates input data and is subject to periodic analysis. The second one is the
analyzed sketch. This sketch is a result of application of analytic function on a
source sketch. The function prototype is: f : S → S.
The high-level algorithm for our correlation method is presented in pseudo-
code in Algorithm 1. On the input it takes analyzed sketches and returns sources
of identified anomalies. The algorithm works in four distinct phases: accumula-
tion, analysis, combination, and aggregation.
Algorithm 1: High-level overview of the correlation algorithm
Input: Set of analyzed sketches
1 begin
2 accumulate sketches with the same key structure;
3 while there are sketches left to analyze do
4 scan sketches for anomaly scores going over threshold;
5 combine sketches that have non-empty intersection;
6 aggregate combined sketches with the same key structure;
7 discard already analyzed sketches;
8 end
9 end
Accumulation Phase In the first phase of the algorithm, anomaly scores of
sketches with identical key parts are summed. This phase is ran only once at the
6 Martin Drasˇar et al.
beginning. A simple sum of values was selected as an appropriate mechanism,
because on the input, there are analyzed sketches whose values are weighted to
be in the same value range. After this phase, the algorithm is left with a set
of analyzed sketches that have different key parts, e. g., K(source IP address,
destination port), K(destination port, destination IP address), and K(source IP
address, destination IP address).
Analysis Phase In the second phase of the algorithm, analyzed sketches are
checked for values crossing an anomaly threshold, and anomalies are eventu-
ally reported. Sketches are linearly scanned for values greater or equal than the
anomaly threshold. Such values are marked in each of the arrays for each hash
function in a sketch. If for a given source IP address the value is greater or equal
to the anomaly threshold in each array, then the source IP address is reported as
anomalous. The reversing processes of our algorithm is identical to the one pro-
posed by Schweller et al. [18], which is available as an open-source solution [12],
and not explained here for the sake of brevity.
Combination phase In the third phase, sketches with different key parts are
combined to create new sketches that capture the influences of original sketches.
Each two sketches that share at least one key part are combined together. The
result of such combination is a new sketch whose key is a union of key parts
of the original sketches, e.g., for two sketches with keys K(source IP address,
destination port) and K(destination IP address, destination port), the resulting
sketch will have a key K(source IP address, destination IP address, destination
port). The principle of this combination is illustrated in the Algorithm 2. For
each non-null value v1 in the sketch s1, all non-null values vi of the sketch s2
which have the same value of shared key parts are added together. The result
of this addition is stored in the new sketch s with the key which is the union of
keys for v1 and all vi.
Example of such combination is given in Table 1.
Aggregation phase In the fourth phase, sketches resulting from the combina-
tion phase with identical key parts are aggregated together. Sketches that were
input to the combination phase do not enter the aggregation phase and are dis-
carded, because their influence is already present in the combined sketches. The
purpose of this phase is to eliminate the growing number of sketches that can
result from the previous phase. This phase is almost the same as the accumula-
tion phase, but values in buckets sharing the same key are not added together.
SIP DPORT Value
A1 B1 X1
A1 B2 X2
⊕
DPORT DIP Value
B1 C1 Y1
B1 C2 Y2
=
SIP DIP DPORT Value
A1 C1 B1 X1 + Y1
A1 C2 B1 X1 + Y2
Table 1: Example of sketch combination
Correlation of Modularly Hashed Sketches 7
Algorithm 2: Combination of sketches with different key parts
Legend: sc, s1, s2: Sketches
Px: Set of key parts of sketch x
s(Py): New sketch with key having key parts Py
h(p): Hash of a value of a key part p
H(p): All possible hash values of a key part p
V (s,K): Values of sketch s at key K in all sketch tables
Input : Two sketches s1 and s2
Output: Combined sketch sc
1 begin
2 sc ← new sketch s(Ps1 ∪ Ps2);
3 for {p1, . . . , pm ∈ (Ps1 ∩ Ps2)} do
4 V (sc,K1 ∪K2)← V (s1,K1) + V (s2,K2) |
K1 = (h(p1) || . . . || h(pm) || H(pm) + 1 || ... || H(p|Psc |)) ∧
K2 = (h(p1) || . . . || h(pm) || H(pm) + 1 || ... || H(p|Psc |)) ∧
V (s1,K1) 6= 0 ∧ V (s2,K2) 6= 0;
5 end
6 end
Only the higher value is kept to prevent the superfluous rapid growth of values
that would result from the repeated addition of anomaly scores from each input
sketch.
4 Method evaluation
To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed method, we have decided to measure
its properties on a real-life network traces containing attacks against Secure Shell
(SSH) and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) services. We have chosen dictionary
attacks because they inherently manifest themselves in several aspects. This was
noted by Hellemons et al. [8] and Vykopal [19]. They discovered that port scan-
ning often precedes dictionary attacks. They have also found flow counts typical
for such attacks. Also Drasˇar [4] has revealed that for automated dictionary at-
tacks low variance in flow count is symptomatical. Based on their observations
we have decided to implement four sketch-based methods covering four different
aspects of dictionary attacks.
4.1 Particular Detection Methods
The first sketch method is source network scan detection, which measures the
number of unsuccessful connections from one IP address to a given port. This
method is implemented on top of a sketch with a key K(source IP address and
destination port). The second sketch method is destination network scan detec-
tion, which measures the number of unsuccessful connections to one IP address
on a given port. The point of this method is to keep the link between attacking
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and attacked computers if, for example, one computer is used for scanning and
the other for attacking. This method is implemented on top of a sketch with a
key K(destination IP address and destination port). The third sketch method
is detection of abnormal number of connections, which measures the number of
successful flows from one source IP address. The point of this method is to re-
veal computers that initiate an abnormally large number of connections which
is always suspicious in case of dictionary attacks. This method is implemented
on top of a sketch with a key K(source IP address and destination port). The
fourth method is low traffic variance detection, which measures whether con-
nections from one IP address to one port exhibit a near-constant pattern. It is
implemented on top of a sketch with key K(source IP address and destination
port).
In the traditional settings, methods such as the proposed ones have thresh-
olds separating anomalies from normal traffic based on heuristic or statistical
properties. However, this approach forces a binary view on an inherently mul-
tivalued one. For example, given a threshold of 30 scanning attempts per five-
minute time window, is it reasonable to expect that an IP address with 29 is
not anomalous? Rather, it could be argued that the IP address is not anomalous
with very low probability. To quantify these probabilities in the aforementioned
detection methods, we have analyzed traffic going over the perimeter of Masaryk
University’s network.
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Fig. 1: Anomaly scores of detection methods
An analysis of traffic in the past year has given us an important insight
into the nature of certain traffic aspects and also outlined an approach for mea-
suring anomaly scores in our four detection methods. For source network scan
detection, we have counted all unsuccessful connections to a given port in five-
minute window frame by each communicating IP address. We have then made
a histogram of the average number of IP addresses initiating such connections.
The result is depicted in Figure 1a. Even a cursory look at the graph reveals
that more than 90 % of IP addresses made less then five unsuccessful connec-
tions in five-minute time window. Based on this observation, we have decided
to set a threshold for maximal anomaly score to a value that represented ∼1 %
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of most active traffic sources. That is, in case of source network scan detec-
tion more than 100 scan attempts were evaluated to maximal anomaly score.
Anomaly score for a lower number of scan attempts is set to be proportional
to how common these attempts are in a network, i. e.: a ratio of a percentile of
given number of connections to difference between minimal and maximal per-
centile: percentile of measured connections − minimal percentile1 − minimal percentile . The same approach
was used for the destination network scan detection, whose result can be seen in
Figure 1b, and for abnormal number of connections, whose results can be seen
in Figure 2a. Anomaly scores for low traffic variance detection were based on a
paper by Drasˇar [4] and set as an inverse of relative difference in flow count.
4.2 Experiment
To test the efficiency of our method, we have analyzed one week of traffic over
the perimeter of Masaryk University. This networks connects about 15.000 ac-
tive computers every day and the data throughput ranges from about 1 Gbit/s
at night to 8 Gbit/s at peak hours. Because this data is not annotated, we
have used two already deployed methods for the detection of bruteforce attacks
against SSH and RDP services to verify our results. These are pattern match-
ing methods based on a research done by Vykopal [19]. Both methods work by
identifying machines that were scanning the network in the previous week and
then attempted to log into one or more targets. The SSH detection method uses
the following pattern: more than 10 scanning attempts on port TCP/22, con-
nects with more than 10 target machines, performs more than 3 login attempts
on each connected host. The RDP detection method uses this one: more than
5 scanning attempts on port TCP/3389, connects with at least one target ma-
chine, performs more than 14 login attempts in case of one target or more than
4 in case of multiple targets. Detected attackers are blocked from accessing the
network for at least a day.
Data from our experiments can be found in Table 2. The table summarizes
the number of anomalies as well as unique IP addresses (in parentheses) that
were marked as anomalous by abnormal number of connection detection, by
accumulation of method with the same key parts and by combination of all
methods. The remaining three particular methods are not included, because no
anomaly crossed the anomaly threshold. Numbers for the two reference methods
are included as well.
4.3 Discussion
Given the high thresholds of our reference methods, we regard all their results as
true positives. This view is also reinforced by deployment experience – in three
years of the SSH attack detection and two years of the RDP attack detection
no identified attack was challenged as a false positive. To estimate false positive
ratio of our proposed method we have then analyzed sample of identified at-
tacking IP addresses not detected by our reference methods. In this sample, all
addresses were confirmed to be attackers. Although not everything was checked,
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Anomalies Connection Accumulation Combination Reference methods
TCP/22 2679 (116) 10045 (264) 26408 (551) (47)
TCP/3389 53 (20) 2175 (1079) 0 (878)
SNS Source Network Scan Detection
DNS Destination Network Scan Detection
Connection Abnormal Number of Connections Detection
Variance Low Traffic Variance Detection
Accumulation Accumulation of SNS, Connection, Variance
Combination Combination of SNS, DNS, Connection, Variance
Table 2: Detected anomalies on ports TCP/22 and TCP/3389 in one week traffic
we have a very high confidence that the rest was true positive too. Estimation
of false negative ratio is even more complicated. As the reference methods are
in a way subset of a detection of our proposed method, there are no measured
false negatives. However, we believe that there still may be attacks evading our
detection, because our thresholds are still relatively high. Complete and rigorous
evaluation of positive and negative ratios would require annotated datasets that
to our knowledge do not yet exist.
Despite certain gaps in the evaluation, we were able to make some key ob-
servations:
– The correlation of data leads to an increase in detection accuracy and num-
ber of detected anomalies that surpasses capabilities of particular detec-
tion methods. This observation is in accord with observation of other re-
searchers [5, 14, 21].
– Even an unoptimized algorithm for correlation was able to process five
minute long windows of traffic over the perimeter of Masaryk University
in units of seconds. This observation is very promising for deployment in
large networks.
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– It was confirmed by overall anomaly scores for dictionary attacks on the SSH
service (see Figure 2b), symptoms of network scanning, connection count,
and low variance are strongly correlated.
– No results in combination of sketches for the RDP service verified our ob-
servation from production use that malware targeting this service does not
precede attacks with large-scale scanning, but rather attacks the first com-
puter available.
Our proposed correlation method can be a powerful tool for the detection of
attacks that are intentionally hidden, as was described in [20], because it adds
together small anomalies that would be otherwise unseen or ignored. It also
enables the sharing of workloads for different detection methods. For example,
our two reference methods both check for scanning IP addresses and the same
computation is done twice. With correlation, this computation can be seamlessly
shared, thus saving computational resources.
Sketch-based methods have proven to be usable and fast enough even on
high-speed networks [18]. Our proposed method builds on this foundation and is
expected to work in a two tier model. In the first tier, source sketches accumulate
data from switches, routers, probes, etc. with fixed memory and computational
constraints. In the second tier, analyses of these sketches and their correlation
are done on more powerful hardware with much relaxed requirements. The cor-
relation phase requires much more memory, because linear growth in key size
requires exponential growth in sketch size. There are, however, some optimiza-
tion techniques that can lower the memory requirements. One can lower key
sizes by intentionally limiting the range of possible values. For example, the net-
work space of Masaryk University is only 216 addresses, so we could shrink the
destination IP key size from 12 bits to only 6. One can also discard values over
anomaly threshold from combination phase and switch in later iterations from
sketches to hash tables. By omitting already reported anomalies, the number of
events to process falls significantly and hash tables can be much more memory
and CPU efficient, even for very large keys.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an approach to correlation based on modularly hashed
reversible sketches. We proposed an algorithm that correlates anomaly reports
from different sources.
The detection algorithm, based on k -ary sketches, has proved to be a suitable
tool for correlation of events with different dimensions. We conducted an exper-
iment in which we deployed the proposed method into a university’s network.
Even though the method’s algorithm was unoptimized, it performed well enough
to analyze the five-minute time windows in units of seconds. Compared to other
deployed methods, the algorithm was able to detect more anomalies without an
increase in the number of false positives.
Our future work will concentrate on addition of new detection methods for
correlation. We will also explore possibilities for optimization.
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